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In this paper I make a preliminary sketch of the field of psychoanalytic psychosocial practice.  I do this 
by looking in detail at four accounts of clinical work which claim to be psychosocial.   I start by 
describing one vector of this field which I use to distinguish between the clinical accounts,  whether 
they believe a psychoanalytic psychosocial  practice can be done within the existing psychoanalytic 
framework, or whether a more radical clinical approach is needed which would fundamentally 
change the way psychoanalysis is practised.  In exploring this vector in more detail, other differences 
between the authors of these clinical accounts emerge: how they understand the connection 
between psychic and social reality, how they understand neutrality, transference and 
countertransference, and how they conceive of the aims of psychoanalysis.  Further elaboration of 
the different ways of understanding these elements and their connection with each other would be 
















This paper addresses a simple question once put to me by a teaching colleague of mine.  We were 
discussing how to better incorporate the impact of social reality on psychoanalytic practice into the 
syllabus of our psychoanalytic trainings.  We wanted to do this for a number of reasons: because we 
felt social reality had been relegated to the margins in much psychoanalytic thinking, because our 
students kept asking for a better understanding of how social forces and dynamics affected their 
therapeutic work, and because this attention to social and cultural difference is part of the 
contemporary Zeitgeist within the world of counselling and psychotherapy. For instance  the 2017 
Ethical Framework of the British Association of Counselling and Psychotherapy, the foremost British 
accrediting body,  states:  “we will respect our clients as people by providing services 
that...endeavour to demonstrate equality, value diversity and ensure inclusion for all clients” (BACP, 
2017).   My colleague said she understood how  teaching students ideas, concepts and theoretical 
frameworks from disciplines other than psychoanalysis – cultural studies, gender studies, critical 
philosophy, histories of colonization and slavery etc., all of which could be broadly subsumed under 
the heading “psychosocial studies” -   would provide a better social, historical and cultural context to 
enable our students to establish a clearer and more robust link between psychic and social reality.  
“But”, she said, “I still don’t understand how all of this translates into clinical practice.” 
 
  I have  found my colleague’s  question surprisingly difficult to answer.  I had thought that once 
equipped with this psychosocial knowledge, linked up with personal experience so as to make this 
knowledge vital and emotionally resonant, our students would find that this teaching in itself would 
produce a change in their clinical practice.  Their eyes would be opened to those aspects of their 
patient’s social reality that  they had previously kept out of their awareness.  From this point of view, 
the issue would no longer be “how to bring social reality into my work” but  “what do I do to keep it 
out -how do I find ways of  suppressing or diverting my awareness of the everyday reality of my 
3 
 
patient’s social identity, particularly in relation to me as therapist?”  I think this does provide a 
partial or preliminary answer to my colleague’s question.  I have found in my own clinical practice 
that it is a good discipline to ask myself, every now and then and particularly when the therapeutic 
relationship with my patient starts to feel a little too comfortable, which aspect of my patient’s 
social reality do I wish to keep out of my clinical thinking?   But I am still left with the question of 
how I will do so.  In particular, can translating psychosocial thinking and ideas into clinical practice be 
done using existing psychoanalytic theoretical and clinical frameworks, so this teaching can be fairly 
easily incorporated into a psychoanalytic syllabus, or does  something more substantial and radical 
need to be taught about how we theorize and how we practice psychoanalysis?  
In order to find a more satisfactory way of  answering my colleague’s question I turned  to the 
psychoanalytic literature which claims to be written from what, broadly speaking, could be termed a 
psychosocial perspective.   I found a large number of papers, many of which contained case studies 
or clinical vignettes which showed clinicians actively and thoughtfully engaged in linking up psychic 
and social reality, particularly concerning issues of racial, cultural, gender and sexual identity and 
differences in class and status between therapist and patient.   But no clear picture emerged, at least 
as far as I could tell, of precisely how this work  could or should be done.  Indeed it was not really 
clear to me whether to think of these papers as constituting a body of work in their own right.  They 
shared a similar interest in exploring social identity, particularly when these were expressed in 
visible differences between patient and therapist.  But a variety of theoretical and clinical 
approaches were used, with no obvious agreement or coherence as to what it might mean to be 
working psychosocially.    In other words, if one thinks as “working psychosocially” (or any variant 
such as “working with difference” or “working in a way that values equality and diversity”) as a kind 
of clinical competence, I could not see from looking at this literature any clear sense of how this 
competence would be differentiated from any other psychoanalytic competence, and how one 
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would know whether this competence was being met – and if it was met, how to tell the difference 
between work in this field that was poor or good.   
 
As my thinking was in danger of getting stuck, I decided to approach my colleague’s question from a 
different angle.  I acknowledged I could not provide an answer to her question – at least not yet.  But 
what I could do was to look at how other key writers in the area had answered her question. Here  I 
decided to follow the example of the Working Party on Comparative Clinical Methods set up by the 
European Psychoanalytic Federation in 1992  which was tasked with comparing the different schools 
of psychoanalytic clinical practice employed by  European analysts.  When they started out, the 
members of the Working Party assumed there was sufficient common ground between the different 
analytic orientations to begin their task of comparing them.  However when they asked their fellow 
analysts to describe their clinical work in detail to each other, they found that such a common 
analytical language could not be assumed.  Analysts would use  the same concepts in very different 
ways to each other, which made communication between them difficult if not at times impossible.  
Furthermore the members of the Working Party noticed discrepancies between how analysts 
claimed they were working, and how they were actually working.  The organizers therefore decided 
that before they could properly begin the task of comparing different clinical approaches, they had 
first of all to simply map out the field of actual clinical practice.  They begun by asking the question: 
how can we best describe, in their own terms, what analysts actually do, what kinds of clinical 
interventions do they actually make and how do they justify or explain the function of these 
interventions?  (Tuckett, 2008, Spurling, 2018).   
 
This is the approach I have adopted in this paper. It is clearly too ambitious for one person in one 
paper to claim to be mapping the whole field of psychoanalytic psychosocial practice, so my aim is to 
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provide a preliminary sketch of the parts of this field that I have encountered.  I have decided to pick  
four clinical accounts claiming to be examples of psychoanalytic psychosocial work (however 
differently described by each author).  This is  obviously a small sample, but would allow some 
exploration in depth of the clinical approach of each author.  I have chosen these accounts because I  
think they are examples of  good clinical writing (Spurling, 2019), in the sense that the  clinical 
approach and description of the actual interventions made is clearly connected to theoretical aims 
and ideas.  Furthermore the papers  are written with a high degree of transparency and honesty on 
the part of the author, which makes it easier for the reader to construct or reconstruct the clinical 
thinking of the writer.  My choice has also been influenced by my own preliminary way of dividing up 
this field, that one can distinguish between two kinds of clinical writing, those which claim to be 
operating within existing psychoanalytic frameworks and those that explicitly claim that new ways of 




The need to reflexively analyze “the very basis of clinical engagement” 
 
 The first paper I have chosen is an example of an approach that seeks to establish a radically 
different kind of analytic practice.  In her  paper “Bearing the Cultural in order to Engage in a Process 
of Witnessing”, Katie Gentile starts from the position that the transferences that occur within 
psychoanalytic work are already shaped by the racial and cultural oppression that is part of our 
culture,  and so in order to try to take account of this the analyst needs to try to reflexively analyse “ 
the very basis of clinical engagement, including how our subjectivities and identities emerge, as 
products of culture, created through technologies of power and oppression” (Gentile, 2013, p.463).   
In her paper Gentile describes her work as a white therapist  with a female Latino (footnote 1) 
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patient.  Gentile demonstrates how she uses her psychosocial understanding of how “cultural 
realities” get played out in ordinary interactions, including therapeutic ones, with the aim of 
counteracting the effect of such ordinary oppression: 
 
were we not to struggle to find a way to articulate the very real continuous racist and classist 
violence of privilege in bodies and words, our relationship would have to re-enact, on some 
level, the myth that the violence in her life emanated from her Latino cultural heritage, while 
the white, clinical world could emerge, evacuated both of its violence, and thus, of its 
accountability, even as it would also become the safe space of her healing (p.464) 
 
Gentile describes her clinical conflict over how to work with her Latino patient’s disclosure to Gentile 
of how she had been sexually abused by her Latino father.  On the one hand she could see she 
needed to  support her patient’s rage, disillusionment and shame  in not blaming herself,  and 
facilitate the recognition and acceptance of her anger against her father.  On the other hand, by 
allowing her patient to legitimately blame her father for his abusive act, she could see that she 
risked  trapping her patient further within the powerful social norm that equates the Latino heritage 
with violence.  In order to counteract the effect of these oppressive social myths and norms, Gentile 
describes how she aimed to create a therapeutic space in which she and the patient could talk 
together about their impact on the analytic work:  “we could discuss how our assumed differences in 
ethnicity, social class, and privilege impacted on our various ways of engaging with each other and 
how we saw the world” (p.465).  However Gentile also recognized that these collaborative 




But these discussions felt intellectual, hyperrational, and dissociated from our nonverbal, 
embodied transference of murky merging and abusive invasion.  In this area of relating, we 
rigidly re-enacted her abuse at the hands of her father and mother (p.465) 
 
In order to free both herself and her patient from this “murky” and “abusive” transference, and so  
transform   the more intellectual discussions between them into more  embodied and emotionally 
resonant experiences,  Gentile reminded her patient of a male Latino psychology professor she had 
previously described as warm and caring, and asked her whether she ever wondered  whether he 
abused his daughter, to which her patient replied no.  Gentile writes “together we come up with the 
observation/meaning that maybe some fathers just somehow know, without their daughters having 
to tell them, that they shouldn’t have sex with their children” (p.464).  In her paper she explains this 
intervention  as an attempt to create “a gendered and raced form of triangulation – pulling in a 
father figure [who was] not just any ‘father’ but a Latino psychologist [who] could function as a 
bridge in the moment for both of us, enabling a form of empathy that held, as opposed to split off, 
some of my culpability as a perpetrator” (pp.465-6). 
 
In Gentile’s description of this phase of the analytic work with her patient we can see how her way 
of working  follows from her assumption that psychoanalysis in general and the analyst in particular 
are so deeply embedded  in the racist and classist structure of the society within which both she and 
her patient are positioned that even the most basic clinical tools such as transference are implicated 
if not contaminated, and so of doubtful clinical benefit. So Gentile, at least in this phase of the work, 
has to create  a different kind of dialogue, not a transference-based interpretive one which, 
presumably would risk reinforcing the analyst’s social position of superiority, but one based on 
mutuality and joint exploration of how both patient and analyst position and become positioned in 
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the analytic relationship in terms of cultural forms of power.  Gentile seems to see her analytic role 
here as taking the lead in such conversations by opening up her own position of white privilege for 
mutual exploration, a position in which  she defines herself as a “perpetrator” of some of the 
violence and oppression to which her patient, as a working class Latino woman, is routinely 
subjected.   
 
While seeing such mutual exploration as an essential part of the analysis, Gentile also recognizes its 
limitation.  She acknowledges that intellectual conversation can all too easily be used as a defence 
against powerful emotional feelings and disturbing thoughts.  In order to counteract this tendency, 
she tries to explore her own more emotional responses to her patient in order to see whether these 
can be used to inform and give more emotional weight to the analytic exploration with the patient, 
or whether they are getting in the way of furthering such a process.   For instance while her patient 
was telling her of the details of the sexual abuse by her father,  Gentile describes physical reactions 
so strong that at times she felt unable to breathe: “I would feel an invisible force lying on my body; a 
pressure on my chest and lap such that each breath was an effort” (p.459).  She takes these affects 
as signs of the crushing weight of social and cultural norms, some of which help her better 
empathically understand her patient – as a woman she can understand the paralyzing effect on 
female victims of male violence – but some of which seem to render her unable to think about how 
to make therapeutic use of her understanding of herself not only as a victim but also as a 
“perpetrator”. 
In order to regain her capacity to think Gentile realizes she needs to process these powerful 
reactions to her patient.  This is why she makes the clinical intervention of bringing in the Latino 
professor, as a way of inaugurating a mutual discussion of what makes good fathering,  to give both 
herself and her patient a breathing and thinking space in order  for them to  find the most 
appropriate context for understanding the abuse by her father.  Here Gentile can be seen as finding 
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a form of language in which to explore with her patient the intersection of the social categories of 
race, gender, age and authority, together with cultural discourses on what it means to be a caring 
man (or woman).  Pitching her understanding of the patient’s abuse at the psychosocial level, by 
creating a form of psychosocial transference, enables her  to challenge her patient’s shame over her 
Latino heritage in order to transform it into a potential resource for her.    Gentile positions herself 
as essentially implicated in this exploration, and so seeks a form of clinical  intervention that will 
enable her and her patient to take account of this mutual implication in a therapeutically productive 
way.  Hence she describes the aim of her intervention as creating  a form of “triangulation” for both 
her patient and herself, a “bridge” between categories, in particular those of  “perpetrator” and 
“victim” that might otherwise seem impossible to bring together.  Her  intervention here could be 
understood as using an emotionally charged figure in the patient’s life to create what Ronald Britton 
has called a “missing link” or “third position” (Britton, 1989), or what  Antonino Ferro calls an 
“affective hologram” (2009), by which he means how an analyst makes use of an emotionally 
invested character in the patient’s life to represent and contain  very powerful and deeply 
embedded emotions which might otherwise remain unrepresentable. But for Gentile, working from 
a psychosocial perspective, such clinical terms take on a difference meaning.  For her the “missing 
link” is the link between psychic and social reality, and those repressed or powerful emotions which 
defy representation are best accessed (at least in this instance) through an exploration of the social 
norms that normally obscure them.  Furthermore as for Gentile, at least in this example, 
transference is a site of resistance and repetition rather than psychic change, it would be misleading 
to describe Gentile’s way of thinking about and processing her very strong physical and emotional 
feelings as “countertransference”, as that would mean she would think of these reactions as the 
counterpart in her of the prevailing transference.  She uses her emotional reactions to the patient 




Psychosocial thinking as providing a missing social context 
 
The second account I have chosen also illustrates this kind of more radical thinking about what 
would constitute a psychoanalytic psychosocial practice. It is in the form of a vignette in a chapter 
written by Lynne Layton in which she looks back over her long clinical career as having been devoted 
to developing  “  a theory of the ways in which cultural inequalities of race, class, sex and gender 
enter into what happens in the clinic” (Layton, 2018, p.210).  She acknowledges that these social 
categories need to be integrated with the “singularity” of each patient which it is the analytic task to 
reveal or construct.   
 
For example, if a patient is a white working class female, I want to know how this particular 
person has lived and is living both the facilitating and constricting aspects of class, sexuality, 
gender and race.  I think about these categories as existing intersectionally;  for example, the 
way that gender is lived is always marked not only by gender relations but by class, sexual 
and racial relations (p.210) 
 
Her particular focus is on the ways patients in contemporary Western societies are largely unaware 
of  what seem like free choices – of how to live, who they are and what they can become – are in 
fact conditioned by social forces beyond their control.  But if patients can be shown that their 
choices are limited in this way, as she puts it “if they come to recognize that their choices were made 
within particular psychosocial “architectures of choice” (p.228), then they are less likely to blame 
themselves for their failures.  This means finding a way of “supplying the social context” which will 
give them a more realistic and productive framework within which to make sense of their lives and 





Her particular way of doing this is by exploring the analyst-patient relationship to see how both 
parties can so easily fall into ways of thinking that minimize or ignore this social context.  She does 
this through a mutual exploration with her patients of what she  calls  “normative unconscious 
processes” (Layton, 2006b), which structure the way we experience our identity and sense of 
ourselves.  These normative unconscious processes can also find expression in political ideologies 
such as neo-liberalism. When  these unconscious processes are powerfully activated, then  “cultural 
inequalities are at times unconsciously and performatively reproduced” in the relationship between 
analyst and patient (2018, p.210).   
 
Whereas in Gentile’s clinical example the analyst had to work hard to bring to light for mutual 
exploration the operation of these cultural inequalities, Layton gives examples from her clinical work 
where the analytic task is more to foster the patient’s own developing curiosity about the operation 
of these social forces in their lives.   For Layton this means as analyst paying particular attention to  
any impulse in herself which might deflect from this psychosocial  focus.  In her 2006 paper,  
“Attacks on linking: the unconscious pull to dissociate individuals from their social context”, (Layton, 
2006a)  she gives an example of a patient who dreamt of having a political conversation with John 
Kerry, then American Secretary of State.  Layton describes her clinical strategy as one of resisting her 
own pull towards interpreting this dream in terms of the patient’s individual and interpersonal 
history -  “I had the sense that while her passion about what was happening politically might have 
had multiple psychic sources and motivations, it would be a mistake to understand what she was 
saying as mere displacement” (p.113, italics added).   Instead she encouraged the patient to continue 
this imagined conversation, which then allowed the patient “ to go more deeply into what she felt 
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about the state of the country, evincing a level of passion and state of conviction that I rarely had 
glimpsed in her” (2006a, p.112).  Layton describes this clinical event as an example of her aim in her 
psychoanalytic  work of helping her patient develop a capacity for social awareness and political 
engagement as well as the capacity to love and to work, an aim which would follow from her 
conception of psychoanalysis as needing to engage with cultural inequalities.  One can also see how 
this overall conception of psychoanalysis informs her way, at least in this instance, of deepening and 
furthering the analytic process, as she describes how having the confidence to develop her political 
awareness becomes the vehicle for the patient to gain access to feelings at a deeper level and 
thereby discover and develop her own sense of the person she wanted to become.  
 
In her 2018 paper she gives another example of this approach in a brief clinical vignette.   
   
A middle class white female patient had become ashamed of what she felt her family 
members condemned as too much desire for attention.  When I began seeing her, she was in 
fact quite constricted.  Sometime during our work together I moved into a home office, 
which I had decorated in higher style than the office I had been renting. In our first meeting 
in the new office, the theme of entitlement and selfishness arose.  The patient spoke about 
having just read Barbara Ehrenreich’s book Nickel and Dimed, and said she felt guilty and 
indulgent about having hired a maid for the first time.  I said, ‘It’s hard to acknowledge that 
you’re privileged”.  She agreed and held out her hand to show me her nails, which she had 
recently had done in clear polish.  She said, ‘I get my nails done, I have a therapist in 
Brookline in a place like this”.  My own privilege having been invoked, I think I felt anxious 
and did not know what to do with the guilt over privilege, hers, mine, ours.  I remember 
having tried to normalize the privilege, saying something like, ‘You don’t have to feel guilty 
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for having nice things’.  I think this comment closed down something the patient was trying 
to say, something that went against the neoliberal grain because it attempted to connect 
her fortune to the misfortune of others.  My first comment had kept the question of 
privilege open;  the second one closed it down.  There was something significant to explore 
here about our mutual discomfort about our privilege and its connection to the lack of 
privilege all around us, and I would suggest normalizing privilege is perhaps a neoliberalizing 
practice that keeps class inequality in place.  This example illustrates that technical choices 
that focus on the individual as separate from the social are quite different from those that 
focus on the individual as psychosocial (p.229) 
 
What is striking about this vignette is how Layton’s description of her patient and her own clinical 
thinking is framed almost entirely in psychosocial terms, that is how she and her patient are 
positioning themselves in terms of social identity, particularly around aspects of privilege and 
entitlement.  The patient is described in terms of her class, race and gender, and then in terms of her 
inhabiting and aspiring to particular geographical locations which carry meanings in terms of money 
and prestige.  The more  personal qualities of her patient are revealed in how she describes her 
relationship to other people– the novelist whose book she has read, the maid she has hired, the 
therapist who has moved to a fancy office.  These characters are all located in a social sphere.  They 
are used by Layton as indicators of  psychosocial vectors, carriers of social class, status, gender etc., 
that  structure the patient’s affective and experiential life.  Feelings are treated by Layton not only as 
personal attributes but also as having a social circulation (Wetherill, 2015).  For instance the 
patient’s shame is put into a social context, which allows for the patient to begin to discriminate 
between shame as a feature of her internal world in which she has continued to construct the world 
as constricting her, as it did in her childhood, and a shame which is the result of her dawning and 
painful awareness of her social position as privileged.  It is this socially motivated shame that Layton 
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helps the patient explore, thus helping her to get a handle on her particular “architectures of 
choice”. 
 
Layton’s clinical thinking is oriented towards making and evaluating her interventions in terms of 
whether they open up or close down this psychosocial space.  Her first comment “it’s hard to 
acknowledge that you’re privileged”,  can appear to be no more than a simple observation, 
endorsing her patient’s attempt to describe her feelings and thoughts about her growing realization 
of her position of privilege.  But I think its function is more sophisticated: it serves  to establish the 
figure of the maid as an affective hologram of her psychosocial positioning in the analytic discourse, 
representing the patient’s capacity to allow herself to enjoy her life and her money without shame, 
but  in a way that engages  her growing sense of social responsibility.  The use of the impersonal “it”, 
rather than a more personal statement in the form of “you”, can be seen as an intervention 
designed to help the patient get beyond a tendency to blame herself, and to think only of her 
internal reality, by locating her actions in a wider social sphere.  By saying it is “hard” to make this 
acknowledgement is an implicit reference to the patient’s capacity to identify and challenge the 
operation of normative unconscious processes. 
 
One can see Layton’s judgment that her intervention succeeded in opened up a psychosocial space 
as implicitly based on her reading of how the patient responded to this intervention.  First of all, the 
patient makes what would seem to be a rather childlike gesture to Layton by showing her nails. This 
can be seen as  the patient wanting to take her exploration of social positioning further, by now 
bringing in another person, the manicurist who does her nails,  perhaps serving as an affective 
hologram (of privilege? of making herself beautiful without feeling guilty and ashamed?  of allowing 
herself to take pleasure in “forbidden” activities?).    At the same time it also seems to signal a 
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deepening of the relationship with Layton in a way that seems quite complex: positioning herself in a 
social sphere as someone  like Layton, making herself more vulnerable by  seeking her approval 
(showing her nails) and/or fearing disapproval, and maybe also setting up some kind of 
competitiveness between her and Layton (whose nails are the most beautiful, best manicured?).  
This is a psychosocial sphere which is not only about the more impersonal categories of social class, 
gender etc,. but one that is meaningful, alive and rich with potential meaning and affect for the 
patient. 
 
By contrast Layton judges her second intervention, “you don’t have to feel guilty for having nice 
things”, which she recognizes is an intervention borne out of anxiety, as closing down this 
psychosocial space.  Layton  bases her judgement on a reading of her own motivation: trying to 
normalize privilege instead of exploring it, the result of the activation of normative unconscious 
thinking on her own part to reduce the social to the psychic.  Layton’s defensive retreat  from the 
patient’s exploration of her social responsibility can be seen in the design and construction of her 
second intervention, which far from following on from the first intervention seems to function as a 
way of undermining it.  So  instead of the impersonal “it”, which points to a wider, social sphere, 
Layton directly addresses the patient with the more personal “you”, which seems to direct the 
patient’s  attention back to the psychic sphere as separate from the social.  The content of the 
intervention – “you don’t have to feel guilty” – takes the patient’s guilt not as a spur to painful 
exploration ,which is how the patient’s state of mind is taken in Layton’s first intervention, but now 
as a  problem and therefore something the patient needs help in overcoming.   Even the language 
she uses in this intervention, as in the blandness of the phrase “having nice things” seems designed 




In their different interventions, Gentile and Layton use well established psychoanalytic methods and 
techniques – making use of characters as affective holograms, exploring affects, furthering 
understanding, exploring and processing their own reactions in the session  - in a particular way in 
order to create and develop what might be called a psychosocial space or a psychosocial form of 
transference.  In so doing, they claim they are radically changing the way psychoanalysis is theorized 
and practised.  By contrast the following two authors I have chosen claim to be working 
psychosocially but within well established psychoanalytic parameters and principles. 
 
 
Psychosocial thinking as a deeper engagement with existing psychoanalytic principles 
 
The third clinical description is  given by Fakhry Davids,  taken from his book Internal Racism.  In his 
book he describes how  racism is internalized in the normal mind by a certain kind of “pathological 
organization”, based on a form of object relation between a “self” and a “racialised other” (Davids, 
2011, p.51) .  Davids, who describes himself as a “brown-skinned British immigrant”, gives an 
example from his own practice in which in a session at the beginning of an analysis, after making an 
interpretation to his white, British patient, the patient became overwhelmed with rage, yelling, 
swearing and mocking Davids to such an extent that the patient had tears in his eyes.   Reflecting 
after this session on this violent and intense “onslaught”,  Davids employs his concept of internal 
racism to identify the patient’s overwhelming rage towards him as the activation of a pathological 
organism in his mind.  In seeking confirmation for this theoretical understanding, especially as this 
incident occurred very early in the analysis making it harder for Davids to draw on other material 
from the patient, he draws on his own feelings and reactions to the patient’s behaviour, and in 
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particular the sudden and painful coming to mind of some of his own disturbing experiences of 
having been  the victim of a racial attack: 
Feelings associated with racial harassment – of being immobilized in the grip of helpless fury 
– came flooding back…I realized that these were the very feelings that were alive in me after 
Mr. A’s session, but which I couldn’t name at the time: I had felt  racially attacked (p.24) 
In the next session Davids  interprets the patient’s overwhelming rage directed at him  as an 
“attack”, which he links to the patient having noticed that “I was a foreigner of a different race, and 
that this made him uncomfortable” (p.27).  The patient’s response – “are you accusing me of having 
made a racist attack?” – becomes the basis of some very difficult but ultimately productive work in 
the analysis. 
In this clinical account Davids takes the patient’s rage and links it explicitly to an aspect of social 
reality which he tells the patient is in play in the analytic relationship.  His intervention is thus clearly 
a psychosocial one.  But it is of a different kind to those described by Gentile and Layton.  He 
positions himself as implicated in the patient’s attack on him in the sense of describing himself to 
the patient as the object of this attack. But he uses his clinical understanding not to initiate the kind 
of mutual exploration of racism as something in play in the analysis, nor as something co-created by 
patient and analyst, that we saw in the work of Gentile and Layton.  Instead he makes an 
observation about the patient’s experience of him – the patient noticed he was of a different race 
and this made him uncomfortable.  This is an observation which is also an interpretation designed to 
open up the patient’s thinking about the impact of social reality at this point in the analysis, which it 
succeeds in doing as it is the patient who describes his behaviour as a racist attack.   
 
For Davids the patient’s racism is real, a feature common to the experience of both patient and 
analyst who both live in a racialized society, the features of which Davids explores in his book.    But 
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his clinical focus is not on the patient’s racism “out there” in the real world, as a consequence of 
living in a racialized society, but how it manifests itself in the relationship with the analyst.  The aim  
is to help the patient see his racism as a defence against overwhelming feelings  which become 
activated by certain experiences, in this case by encountering a non-white authority figure in the 
presence of  whom he was starting to feel vulnerable.  Davids then works towards helping the 
patient accept this unwelcome part of his personality by showing him how it is based on feelings and 
states of mind derived from early experiences which have formed a “template” in his mind, one 
which is:   
divided sharply between powerful parents and a powerless infant, whose dependency and 
helplessness are to be exploited, leading to endless resentment and hatred.  It is not difficult 
to see how my Third World appearance presented him with an opportunity to embody the 
elements of this internal situation in the relationship between us, the infantile side lodged 
firmly in me” (p.33) 
 
In this example Davids uses his understanding of social reality, in particular how racist and racialized 
thinking and experiences are formed,  in order to deepen his understanding of the nature of the 
patient’s psychic reality in this clinical encounter.  He does this by using the normal psychoanalytic 
tools at his disposal.  He makes clear his  understanding of what constitutes a psychoanalytic 
psychosocial practice in a  review of Farad Dalal’s book on psychoanalysis and racism, which argues 
that psychoanalysis is incapable of understanding racism as it inevitably reduces social to psychic 
reality.  While acknowledging his debt to Dalal’s understanding of racism, which he draws on in his 
own book,  Davids signals his disagreement with Dalal that psychoanalysis is unable to understand 




observes that psychoanalytic practitioners do not give due weight to racist phenomena as 
they emerge in the consulting room, which he attributes to faulty, reductionist theory.  In 
my view, this assumes too direct a link between clinical phenomena and theory, and I think 
it more likely that failures to deal adequately with racism in the consulting room reflect 
defensiveness on the part of the clinician.  To understand such difficulties more fully would 
require a detailed and nuanced understanding of clinical interactions, which would, in turn, 
require a fuller engagement with psychoanalytic theory (Davids, 2008, p. 1651) 
 
 
Widening the transference and countertransference 
 
I think Davids’ concept of “internal racism”, and his use of this idea in his clinical thinking, would 
constitute a good example of what he might mean by a  “fuller engagement with psychoanalytic 
thinking”.  In order to employ such a concept he makes use of transference, but in a wider way than 
in much of the classic psychoanalytic literature. His use of transference can be compared with one of 
the classic accounts of transference in the psychoanalytic literature, that of Betty Joseph, who took 
the concept of the “total transference” from Melanie Klein and developed it into a key idea within 
British object relations.  Her  basic idea was that of “transference as a framework, in which 
something is always going on, where there is always involvement and activity” (Joseph, 1985, p.447).  
In one of her papers she gives an example of what she means by this:  
With one patient it was possible to open up her feelings that I was antagonistic and controlling, 
that I did not want her to get on in her life or in her career.  As we looked at her feelings about 
my motivation it became clear that in her mind I felt threatened by her, and deeply envious of 
her as a young intelligent person with her life ahead of her.  I would then wish to explore most 
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carefully her picture of me, this old, supposedly lonely, rather embittered person, and her quiet 
conviction of what I was like, and only very slowly and over a long period, hope to explore how 
much of these ideas might be linked with actual observations of myself or the way I function, how 
much projected parts of herself, and so on. (Joseph, 1983, p.148). 
 
I would take this as an exemplary description of what  “working in the transference”  means to many 
psychoanalytic practitioners (particularly those working within the British Object Relations tradition).  
Transference is taken as an ever-present background drama, which every now and then takes centre 
stage.  The point is for the analyst or therapist to accept the “reality” of this transference situation – 
indeed, the analyst needs  to find ways of exploring it so as to make it a vibrant and developing 
drama between patient and analyst. But what is also striking about this account  is the absence of 
social categories and a consideration of how they might affect the transference.  Race, ethnicity and 
culture are   simply absent in this description. When it comes to gender, one might wonder why 
Joseph refers to herself as “this old, supposedly lonely, embittered person” rather than woman.  
Social factors such as social class, privilege, access to money and power are implicit, in the 
background, but not made explicit, so we do not know whether such social realities were actually 
thought about or addressed in the analysis.   
 
If Davids had made an interpretation to his patient that his rage was a reaction to feeling helpless 
and dependent on the analyst as a figure of authority, without making reference to his “Third World 
appearance”, he would have followed this more traditional way of thinking about transference that 
keeps aspects of social reality to the margins.  He chooses instead to make explicit reference to  his 
racial identity to enable his patient and himself to engage even more powerfully with the 
transference, adding layers of complexity and nuance in how the power dynamics of the relationship 
between analyst and patient, here expressed in terms of attacker/attacked and 
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dominance/submission, are played out in the analysis.    For Davids, the “something” that is always 
going on within the transference framework is something that crucially involves the formation and 
negotiation of the patient’s deepest sense of his own social identity. 
 
In this example Davids also implicitly acknowledges that the “something” always going on in the 
transference is  constituted to a greater or lesser degree by those aspects of his own sense of social 
identity which became activated in the analytic encounter.  So a key part of Davids’ clinical thinking 
in widening the transference is his use of his countertransference, in particular his recollection of 
some of his own experiences of being non-white which led him to formulate to himself that in the 
clinical encounter with his enraged patient he had felt racially attacked.    This can be seen as a 
widening of the concept of countertransference in which the analyst’s reactions are taken not only 
as projections from the patient (“the patient reacted to me in such a way that I felt as if I had been 
racially attacked”) but also as a recognition of his own subjectivity as a non-white person living in a 
racialized society (“I felt racially attacked because I have been racially attacked and I recognize what 
it feels like and that is it part of my own subjective experience of someone who is brown skinned 
working with a white patient”).  It may be, then, that Davids brings in more psychosocial thinking 
than is made explicit by how he constitutes and uses his countertransference.   Nevertheless he 
explicitly positions himself as working  “within well-established analytic principles” (2011, p.201).   
 
Psychosocial exploration in the countertransference 
 
The fourth clinical account I have chosen is another example of someone who makes particular use 
of  countertransference in order to work psychosocially.  This is a description by Danielle Knafo In 
her paper, “Anti-Semitism in the Clinical Setting: Transference and Countertransference Dimensions” 
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(Knafo, 1999) of her work  with a patient where the transference became so fixed that for a long 
time in the analysis it became unavailable as a space which could link together psychic and social 
reality.  Knafo describes her interpretive strategy of unfixing this transference as that of helping the 
patient experience and then begin to work through in her experience of the analyst  particular 
traumatic events in  her childhood.  While the transference remained fixed or restricted in this way,  
for a considerable time in the analysis the only clinical space available for  psychosocial thinking was 
in the analyst’s countertransference. 
Like Davids, Knafo believes that the lack of psychoanalytic writing on working with patients who are 
openly anti-Semitic,  and the difficulties described  when such work is undertaken, is a sign not of 
the need to change psychoanalysis but of “personal oversensitivity and defensiveness” on the part 
of  analysts, resulting in a silence  “ which too often is rationalized as analytic neutrality” (1999, 
pp.38-9).  She recounts an experience early in her psychoanalytic career to support this idea, in 
which she found herself unable to continue  working with an anti-Semitic Jewish patient, the son of  
parents who were concentration camp survivors.  This followed a session in which the patient  
recounted  in graphic detail to Knafo  his masturbation fantasies of naked women about to die in 
Nazi gas chambers.   
 
 
 In the middle of his account – and he became visibly excited in the telling – he looked up at 
me and included me in the fantasy.  I inwardly recoiled in horror and fear and felt I could not 
work with him…I was unable to process this man’s hostility in a therapeutic manner because 




In trying to make sense of this experience, Knafo starts from the assumption that the analytic 
relationship is always a social relationship (p.39), and that in this case she felt so threatened by the 
behaviour of the patient and the content of what he was talking about that she lost her ability to 
function psychoanalytically, that is interpret the material.   
 
When this occurs, I believe, anti-Semitic content is treated as an established reality with but 
one possible meaning, the “as if” quality of the transference is thereby lost, and the analysis 
loses the fluidity necessary for the exploration and elaboration of the patient’s psychic 
reality and fantasy life.  As a result, the analyst, like the rest of society, risks becoming 
paralyzed and joining in the “conspiracy of silence”.  In these situations, anti-Semitism 
becomes a vehicle not for the patient’s conflicts and transference, but for conflicts and 
problems of the analyst. (p.39). 
 
Here we can see Knafo’s clinical aim: like Davids,  to use  the patient’s anti-Semitism as a “vehicle” 
for  exploring their innermost conflicts and traumas as they become activated in the transference.  In 
such cases she judges  the realm of social reality to be so massive or impermeable,  in allowing of 
only one meaning in an absolute sense, that it becomes therapeutically unavailable for mutual 
exploration.  No productive link between social and psychic reality then becomes possible.  In her 
paper Knafo describes her own  development as an analyst in encountering such clinical situations, 
no longer  retreating in the face of her patients’ anti-Semitism when it is experienced  “as a uniform 
social phenomenon that is not to be touched” (p.40), but to find a way of working with anti-Semitic 




Knafo illustrates her approach in her description of her  five times weekly ongoing analytic work with 
Ms. C, whose anti-Semitism had become “fixed in the transference” to such an extent that it 
threatened to overwhelm the patient and derail the analysis.  Ms. C asserted that the most 
important event in her life was  the abrupt departure of her Jewish father when she was eight years 
old.  This left her to be looked after by her Catholic mother, whom Ms. C consistently described as 
psychotic and abusive.  This meant that Ms. C “equated Jews with the rejection she had experienced 
at the hands of her father” (p.47).  
 
Knafo describes how the patient, in her determination to discover or construct her own sense of 
Jewish identity, became interested to the point of obsession with Knafo’s  Jewish background and 
identity. The patient had found out from the referral source that Knafo was Jewish and born in 
Morocco, and remarked in the initial consultation how “intriguing and exotic” she found these 
origins. The intensity of Ms. C’s feelings towards Knafo  reached a climax in a series of sessions in the 
third year of the analysis, in which Ms. C expressed her envy for what she described as Knafo’s 
“rootedness in Judaism” (p.54). She spoke of wishing but not daring to ask Knafo whether she 
considered her Jewish – what if she brought Knafo the results of a blood test proving she was her 
father’s daughter, would Knafo then accept her? 
 
 “You probably think, “poor thing., she’s deluded about being Jewish!” she exclaimed.  I 
interpreted that she wished for me to be the pretraumatic good father whose closeness 
guaranteed her Jewishness and all the positive memories associated with it” (p.54)  
 
Here we can see how Knafo interprets the patient’s intense wish for her to accept Ms. C as Jewish as 
the activation of an internal template that equates Knafo with the wished-for or remembered image 
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of a good and accepting father.  This is an example of Knafo’s interpretive strategy of working first to 
develop and enrich the psychic sphere before making any explicit links to social reality.  Indeed she 
actively resists the patient’s invitations to actively position herself on how Jewish identity can be 
defined and conferred.  Another example of this is when the patient is described as frequently 
referring to the difference between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews – here would be another 
opportunity for the analyst to open up a social dimension to the patient’s obsessive and self-
destructive drive to locate herself as Jewish.   But Knafo does not make any explicit reference to such 
psychosocial thinking.  We do not know, for instance, how she responded to the patient describing 
her Moroccan origins as “intriguing and exotic”, which may be  a reference to  differences in skin 
colour and/or cultural differences, and could also perhaps be seen as an example of what Edward 
Said has called “Orientialism,” how people in the West conceive of the East  (Said, 2003). 
 
We might surmise that a clinical strategy of supplying a missing social context or developing a 
psychosocial space in the analysis would be seen as premature, serving to divert  Knafo’s prime 
clinical task as this point in the analysis as that of unfixing the transference as a psychic space.   In 
fact Knafo goes on to describe how, once this transference crisis has been sufficiently weathered, 
Ms. C was able to develop a capacity to reflect on herself, and so able to see her anti-Semitic feelings 
as “reflections primarily of her own self” (p.57).  Her clinical strategy seems to be that the patient’s 
defences against experiencing her psychic reality needed to be worked through so that she could 
develop a richer and more nuanced kind of psychic reality which would be able to be linked up to a 
sense of social reality no longer so massive and absolute but now allowing for more complexity.  
Following these sessions Ms. C started to bring  dreams in which relationships with other people 
were no longer experienced in simple and absolute black and white terms.  She invented a word, 
“heteroclite” as the opposite of “orthodox”, to describe such relationships, observing:  “Until 
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recently  I never thought I had conflicts.  I felt one way or the other.  Never two things at the same 
time.  That has changed” (p.56).    
 
If Knafo’s clinical strategy with this patient at this point in the analysis does not make any explicit 
links between social and psychic reality, where does Knafo claim to do her psychosocial thinking?  
The answer is in her personal and private exploration of her own Jewish identity.  She recounts that 
the intensity and extreme nature of  Ms.C’s transference initially led her to deny she had any 
personal reactions.   But once she started to use her own personal analysis to understand how her 
own background and personal experiences as a Jew were impacting on her analytic work, she was 
able to use her own reactions as  a resource she could deploy “ in the service of the treatment” 
(p.58),  to better understand and empathize with Ms. C’s predicament.  As Knafo puts it, she had to 
try to answer the very questions she was posing to Ms. C: 
 
What kind of Jew was I?  Was my Judaism destined to be defined by my parents, or could I 
find a definition that suited me?  And, being an immigrant who came from a very different 
background, did I not too struggle with bringing together within myself the different sides of 
what often felt like an irreconcilable cultural rift? (p.53) 
 
In the course of such reflections she was able to recognize that “my Jewishness was clearly a 
complex matter, one that involved issues of identity, migration, and discrimination on the part of 
Jews and non-Jews alike” (p.58).  This description is clearly rooted in a psychosocial framework.  
Indeed in describing herself as having to answer the same painfully complex questions about Jewish 
identity for herself that Ms. C was posing in the analysis, and so having to go through a process not 
unlike that undergone by her patient, one might wonder whether, rather like Davids, she is implicitly 
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widening the concept of countertransference to refer to some aspects of her own subjectivity as 
these were brought into play in the analysis.  But, like Davids, she makes no such claim in her work.  
Instead what is evident is that she considers the fruit of the psychic work on herself to be shown in 
her ability to work more fully and in a more engaged way with her patient in the transference than 
she had been able to do with the patient she had encountered early in her career:  
 
I was once again confronted with a patient who expressed “concern” over her conviction 
that I had lost my entire family in World War II.  This time, rather than respond defensively 
to her statement, I tried to explore and clarify what personal reasons she might have for 
killing off all my relatives (p.58). 
 
What kind of comparative framework? 
Despite the many limitations of this preliminary mapping of the field of psychosocial thinking within 
psychoanalysis – the small sample, chosen on personal grounds, without sufficient space for 
exploration of more work by each clinician to provide a more robust context for the clinical 
discussion, as well as  having to make assumptions about the clinical thinking of each author without 
being able to discuss this directly with them – a close exploration of the clinical thinking of the 
authors chosen has led to the identification of  some key elements of what might constitute the 
outline of a comparative framework.  I started out with a rather crude assumption that clinical 
accounts of psychosocial psychoanalytic thinking could be differentiated in terms of whether or not 
they called for a radical change in the way psychoanalysts theorize and practice.  I can now break 
this differentiating vector down into several differentiating components.  
One difference is in how the term “psychosocial” is understood.  In the clinical writing of Gentile and 
Layton it seems clear that for them psychic and social reality are inextricably linked to each other, so 
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much so that any attempt to conceive of them as separate realms risks producing a version of 
psychoanalytic practice that at best obscures and at worst perpetuates existing forms of social 
oppression and inequality.  One might say for them that it is psychosocial thinking that is primary, 
the basic framework of their thinking, and that they view psychoanalytic theorizing and practice as a 
particular form of psychosocial thinking and practice.  Looking at the debate conducted between a 
number of writers as to the meaning of “psychosocial” in the 2008 edition of the journal 
“Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society”, their conception seems close to the definition given by  Lisa 
Baraitser and Stephen Frosh in their contention that a  psychosocial  perspective is fundamentally 
disruptive of normal  psychoanalytic practice.  They  recognize the need in psychoanalytic practice to 
give value to “ personal experience, interconnectedness, intersubjectivity, affect, embodiment, 
agency and most importantly the impulse to articulate a kind of ethical subject”.  But their version of 
the psychosocial serves  at the same time to completely disrupt this agenda “through the force of 
the revelation that there is no human subject, that what we take to be the realm of the personal, 
including the famous “inner world” of psychoanalysis, is either wavering, fragmentary and lost, or a 
thoroughly fictional entity” (Frosh and Baraitser, 2008, p.3).   
 
By contrast  Paul Hoggett, argues that the “internal and external worlds that make up psychic reality, 
while overlapping and mutually constituting, are also irreducible to each other”.  
 
Each is governed by its own rules of structure formation. For the inner world these rules are 
part of what we call our psycho-logic…condensation, repression, projection, identification 
etc…they are not social constructions.  I would go so far as to say that they can be discerned 
at work in all human societies;  they are, in a sense, constitutive of what it means to be 
human.  Similarly I believe the external world would have its own rules of structure 
formation that govern economy and society” (Hoggett, 2008,  p.4) 
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If one were to develop this difference in how the relationship between psychic and social is 
understood further as a vector in this field, one might wonder whether it would generate different 
concepts of intersectionality, for instance whether what would constitute a good psychoanalytic 
psychosocial account should make reference to a range of different aspects of social identity and 
how they relate to each other. 
 
In this definition of psychosocial there is room for an exploration of the psychic or social realms to 
some extent on their own terms, a conception of psychosocial thinking that would seem to support 
the practice of Davids and Knafo, for whom it might be said that their primary aim is to think and 
work psychoanalytically, so that any kind of psychosocial thinking would need to be accommodated 
within existing psychoanalytic principles.   If one were to develop this difference in how the 
relationship between psychic and social is understood further as a vector in this field, one might 
wonder whether it would generate different concepts of intersectionality, for instance whether what 
would constitute a good psychoanalytic psychosocial account should make reference to a range of 




What is also at stake in comparing these difference clinical accounts  is not only different ideas of 
what it means to think psychosocially but different  versions of psychoanalysis as well, particularly 
when it comes to thinking of transference and countertransference. What is striking about the 
clinical accounts given by Gentile and Layton is the absence of instances of working in or with the 
transference in a conventional psychoanalytic way.  Indeed for them to think and work 
psychosocially means eschewing a traditional transference interpretation, which for them would 
mean keeping understanding within the realms of the intra-psychic and interpersonal realms at the 
expense of social reality.  This might render their clinical thinking vulnerable to a reading that could 
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view their strategy of opening up a psychosocial space as a defence against recognizing the full 
impact of the transference relationship, for instance one of oedipal rivalry and/or maternal 
dependence.  However both Gentile and Layton argue in the particular clinical situations they 
describe that interpreting transferentially in this sense would simply lock their patients into a 
repetition of their original traumatic situation.  In these situations making interventions based on the 
transference would be  seen by then as a form of resistance rather than having the potential for 
change.   
 
By contrast Davids and Knafo work with a conception of transference as the site par excellence of 
psychic change in psychoanalysis, and the way of linking psychic and social reality.  Such a view of 
transference can be seen to draw on  one of the ways Freud characterized transference in his papers 
on technique, where he described transference as “ a piece of real experience” but “of a provisional 
nature”  (1914, p.154).  By “provisional nature” Freud meant  “an intermediate region between 
illness and real life through which the transition from the one to the other is made” (SE X11 154).   
 
 
There is a danger here of generalizing from too little clinical data.  In Gentile’s account of  the 
particular phase of the work with her patient - in which she argues that a psychosocial way of 
working proved generative in finding a way out of a culturally determined theoretical and clinical 
impasse in which helping her patient recover from violence might be at the cost of reinstating 
unconscious cultural forms of violence - it may be that she made use of more conventional 
transference interpretations in other parts of the work.  In Layton’s case we can find examples in her 
clinical work elsewhere of more conventional transference interpretations (for example, Layton 
2018, p.2 where she makes a direct transference interpretation to her patient concerning a dream 
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told in the analysis).  Indeed Layton acknowledges that in her clinical writing  she  “doesn’t always 
bother with describing the kinds of things most analysts do and that I do, too, because  my work has 
been aimed at an absence in the literature, at illuminating the psychosocial dimension of 
subjectivity” (Layton, 2018c).   
 
Nevertheless the differences in how transference is understood and used seems a very important 
vector in the field, as does the way countertransference is thought of.  Whereas Gentile and Layton 
use their reactions to the patient and to the work as ways of registering the operation of 
psychosocial norms and structures, what might be called part of a mutual psychosocial transference 
between analyst and patient, Davids and Knafo write of their countertransference as their “counter” 
to the patient’s transference – even though in their actual use of the term they may be widening the 
concept to include some conception of themselves as subjects in a psychosocial field. 
 
These differences in how transference and countertransference are conceived can be seen to rest on 
fundamental differences about the aims of psychoanalysis which would translate into different 
understandings of what the analyst is trying to do and how to go about doing it.  One way of 
exploring this further would be through an investigation of what each of these authors understands 
by the analytic concept of “neutrality”.  Although  Davids and Knafo make no explicit reference to 
this term, in their description of their clinical interventions and interpretations they would seem to 
operate within a traditional or long established idea of neutrality, as for example defined by Freud in 
his injunction that the analyst “should be opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should show 
them nothing but what us shown to him” (Freud, 1912, p.118).  By contrast Gentile and Layton in 
their writing and in their description of their analytic affiliations could be seen to be operating with a 
concept of neutrality as described by Owen Renik’s description of his analytic stance as one of  
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“complete analytic symmetry” -  by which he means “analyst and analyzand are equally subjective, 
and both are responsible for full disclosure of their thinking, as they see it relevant to the reality of 
the psychoanalytic endeavour” (Renik, 1995,  p.486).   The idea of “full disclosure” of one’s thinking 
can be taken, as it would seem to be by Gentile and Layton, as meaning a mutual exploration with 
the patient of how each is positioned in social as well as psychic reality.  
 
 But for those clinicians operating within a more traditional notion of analytic neutrality, such a view 
would be in danger of confusing analysing with moralizing.  For instance  in Winnicott’s classic 
account of how Freud created the setting which allowed analytic work to be done he asserts that it is 
“well known” that the analyst “keeps moral judgment out of the relationship, has no wish to intrude 
with details of the analyst's personal life and ideas, and the analyst does not wish to take sides in the 
persecutory systems even when these appear in the form of real shared situations, local, political, 
etc.”  (1954, p.284).   So if we are to use neutrality as one of the vectors in this field of 
psychoanalytic psychosocial practice, we would need a much deeper exploration of how different 
writers understand the relationship between analysis, morality and politics.  Even in Winnicott’s 
formulation, we might wonder what he means by “persecutory systems” which might appear in the 
form of “real shared situations”.  He does go on to say that  in some social situations, such as “if the 
king dies” the analyst should be “not unaware”.  What has happened, then, within the analytic 
community as a whole, is that Winnicott’s attitude of being “not unaware” has changed into one of 
needing to be aware, or being more explicitly aware, creating a relatively new field of psychoanalytic 







1.  In my discussion of Gentile’s work I have followed her usage of the term “Latino” which seems to 
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